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Connecting the Dots and Dashes
Wireless Telegraphy Communication in the 
Canadian Expeditionary Force, 1914–1918 
B R I A N  P A S C A S
Abstract : This article seeks to explain wireless telegraphy (W/T) 
equipment, its development and use over the course of the First World 
War and how W/T performed in conjunction with the established landline 
network. W/T deployment during Canadian Expeditionary Force battles 
is evaluated to determine whether W/T was viewed as an alternative 
battlefield communication medium or simply as a standby for emergency 
situations. The analysis discloses that the Canadian infantry was unable 
to take advantage of continuous wave, a superior form of wireless that 
the artillery relied upon. This article contends that by war’s end W/T 
had become a viable substitute for traditional wired networks, but was 
underutilised whenever the cable grid was operational.
A cAnAdiAn bAttAlion signAller (“dot-and-dasher”) wrote: “Communication was the blood in the arteries of War, and any 
neglect in this vital area would quickly weaken, if not endanger, the 
lives of the fighting men up front.”1 John Terraine claims that early 
twentieth century technology is the key to understanding the First 
World War.2 Andrew McNaughton, who commanded the Canadian 
Corps Heavy Artillery, declared: “1917 was a year of application of 
1  Victor Wheeler, The 50th Battalion in No Man’s Land (Calgary: The Alberta 
Historical Resources Foundation, 1980), 261.
2  John Terraine, “Understanding,” Stand To! 34 (Spring 1992): 9.
© Canadian Military History 2020
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engineering and science to the technique of war.”3 According to Tim 
Travers, the impact of technology in 1918 was one of several factors that 
brought victory.4 The First World War’s four essential technologies 
were weaponry, transportation, aviation and telecommunications.5 
Although not infallible, communications were conceivably “the 
life of operations.”6 Control of battle was restricted to what the 
transmission mechanisms conveyed to General Headquarters (GHQ) 
and to army, corps, division, brigade, battalion, company and battery 
headquarters. More importantly—during the fog of war—accurate 
tactical information had to be communicated in real-time from all 
units and formations to decision makers at command and staff levels.7 
At times, an intelligence vacuum existed in the command structure. 
Paddy Griffith maintains that in an attack, the unavoidable delay 
in message transmission between the front line and high command 
probably was the one factor preventing a decisive breakout.8 According 
to Brigadier Shelford Bidwell, an initial breakthrough could not be 
exploited until interrupted communications were restored.9 Corps 
staff on occasion possessed more information (received from contact 
aircraft) than divisional or brigade officers; this intelligence had to 
be forwarded.10 Lacking communications, “[t]he army is then fighting 
3  “Discussions of Military Tactics, Weaponry and the Leaders,” Chapter 11, Disc 2, 
Flanders’ Fields: Canadian Voices From WWI, directed by J. Frank Willis (CBC 
Audio, 2006), DVD; and CBC Radio interviews, accessed 29 June 2020, https://
www.mediafire.com/folder/pnu2i8222l7j2/S3_Flanders_Fields_Transcripts. 
4  Tim Travers, How the War was Won: Command and Technology in the British 
Army on the Western Front, 1917-1918 (Barnley, UK: Pen & Sword Military Classic, 
2005), 2.
5  Michael Crawshaw, “The Impact of Technology on the BEF and its Commander,” 
in Haig: A Reappraisal 70 Years On, ed. Brian Bond and Nigel Cave (Barnsley, UK: 
Leo Cooper, 1999), 160.
6  War Diary [WD], 10th Canadian Infantry Brigade, August 1918, Appendix D, 
RG9 III-D-3, Volume 4903, File 311, Library and Archives Canada [LAC].
7  For a general understanding of the various methods of communications in the First 
World War, see Bill Rawling, “Communications in the Canadian Corps, 1915-1918: 
Wartime Technological Progress Revisited,” Canadian Military History 3, 2 (1994): 
6-21.
8  Paddy Griffith, Battle Tactics of the Western Front: The British Army’s Art of 
Attack 1916-18 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1994), 174-75.
9  Shelford Bidwell, Modern Warfare: A Study of Men, Weapons and Theories 
(London: Allen Lane, 1973), 82.
10  Andrew Simpson, Directing Operations: British Corps Command on the Western 
Front 1914-18 (Warwick, England: Helion & Company, 2019), 71.
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without a brain; or worse still, with a disordered brain which acts 
regardless of reality.”11 
Publications and studies, past and present, of wireless telegraphy 
(W/T) development and deployment during the First World War 
are examined to assess W/T effectiveness on the Western Front 
and, in particular, its bearing on Canadian Corps’ operations. Five 
contributors, three of whom served in a military signalling capacity 
during the war, are referenced frequently. Basil Schonland, British 
Signal Service wireless officer, published a four-part series of wireless 
articles in 1919. Raymond Priestley, Royal Engineer officer in wireless 
operations and training, wrote an account in 1921 of the British Signal 
Service in the First World War. William Arthur Steel, 4th Canadian 
Divisional Signal Company officer and later Canadian Corps Signal 
Company officer, wrote an eight-part series of wireless articles from 
1929 to 1931 based on a wireless communication report issued in 
1919. Laurence Lyons and Mike Bullock have written the first book-
length study on British signals in the First World War since Priestley. 
Brian Hall has contributed significantly to the latest scholarship on 
communications on the Western Front and other operational theatres.
In an on-going academic debate, the duo of Bullock and Lyons 
contend that British high command possessed neither the vision that 
continuous wave (CW) wireless would “revolutionize command and 
control” nor the will to deploy resources necessary to engineer reliable 
CW wireless sets and this “institutional bias” prevented enhanced 
communications.12 Hall maintains the British Army exploited the 
“full military potential” of wireless during the war and in particular 
of CW wireless in 1918.13 Rather than engaging in this discussion, 
the focus of this article is the Canadian infantry, artillery and cavalry 
formations’ effort to organise, issue and use W/T on the Western 
Front. Wireless capabilities during both static and open warfare are 
analysed to determine W/T’s impact upon military operations. 
11  Report of the Committee on the Lessons of the Great War Appendix II (The War 
Office, 1932; reprint, Uckfield, UK: Naval & Military Press, 2013), 45.
12  Mike Bullock and Laurence Lyons, Missed Signals on the Western Front: How 
the Slow Adoption of Wireless Restricted British Strategy and Operations in World 
War I (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, 2010), 193-94; and Mike Bullock and 
Laurence Lyons, “Response to Dr Brian N. Hall’s Articles on British Wireless in the 
First World War,” War in History 23, 2 (April 2016): 237.
13  Brian Hall, “The British Army and Wireless Communication, 1896-1918,” War In 
History 19, 3 (2012): 319; and Brian Hall, Communications and British Operations on 
the Western Front, 1914-1918 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 303.
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Although W/T was underutilised whenever wired communications 
were available, W/T was a valuable tactical contribution to army 
communication. Newer wireless technology in 1917 enabled W/T 
to become an integral part of battlefield communications. It was 
a reliable auxiliary system to land-based communications and was 
effective in handling emergency situations. But overall, its advantages 
did not outweigh its disadvantages. Tenuous W/T was not a war-
winning communication technology; it had not sufficiently matured 
in the last months of the war to be considered the primary alternative 
to conventional methods of communications in the front lines.
army wireless telegraphy sets and technology 1914-1918
Although the Royal Navy was already the world’s principal user 
of W/T14—after twenty years of development it was a mature 
technology “uniquely suited for naval communications”15—army 
W/T was in its infancy in 1914. Morse code-based W/T sets utilised 
crystal detector receivers16 and spark-gap transmitters. High voltage 
applied across the gap between two mushroom-shaped conductors 
caused a spark to jump the gap, generating a train of electromagnetic 
oscillations which rapidly died out. Its aerial’s radiation generated 
excessive interference into space on a wide radio-frequency band. 
Spark wireless required broad tuning and when a large number of 
sets operated on the same narrow frequency band, they interfered 
with each other.17 Fundamentally, a spark transmitter was “a dirty 
radiator, polluting the spectrum with radiation.”18
A year before the outbreak of war, a report had stated wireless 
communications in the British Army were “so inefficient as to be 
14  Kapil Subramanian and Graeme Gooday, “British Telecommunications History in 
the First World War,” in Britain and the Widening War 1915-1916: From Gallipoli 
to the Somme, ed. Peter Liddle (Barnsley, UK: Pen & Sword Military, 2016), 214.
15  A.J.L. Blond, “Technology and Tradition: Wireless Telegraphy and the Royal 
Navy 1895-1920” (PhD dissertation, University of Lancaster, 1993), 134, 363.
16  Pre-war, the coherer and the Marconi magnetic detector was used for receiving 
Morse code messages. 
17  W. Arthur Steel, “Wireless Telegraphy in the Canadian Corps in France,” 
Canadian Defence Quarterly 7, 4 (July 1930): 458.
18  Hugh Aitken, Syntony and Spark: The Origins of Radio (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1985), 73.
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unreliable, and therefore practically valueless, in time of war.”19 
Nevertheless, the British Expeditionary Force mobilised for war 
with spark technology: Pack sets, Motor Lorry sets and Wagon sets. 
The 500-watt 600-lb Marconi Pack set’s transmitter operated on a 
550, 650 or 750 metre wavelength and its receiver on wavelengths 
from 300 to 1,300 metres. The horse-drawn apparatus included two 
30-foot-high masts. Pack set to Pack set range was 20 to 25 miles.20 
The GHQ-based 1,500-watt petrol engine-powered Motor Lorry 
set covered a 100-mile range with two 70-foot masts. The six-horse 
drawn 1,500 watt Wagon set was equipped with an 80-foot mast, a 
transmitter and a receiver with a 100-mile range. A Pack set could 
transmit over 30 miles to the Wagon set. These wireless stations were 
assembled in fifteen to twenty minutes.
Battalion, brigade and divisional headquarters required field 
wireless sets. In August 1915, the British Field (BF) Trench set was 
designed for forward work.21 A three-man crew operated this 50-watt 
DC spark transmitter/receiver telegraphy set. The set broadcast over 
a 4,000 yard range between BF sets when two 15-foot masts supported 
the aerial. The transmitter operated on a 350, 450 or 550 metre (857 
kHz, 667 kHz or 545 kHz) wavelength.22 The aerial extended from 60 
to 80 yards, depending on wavelength. A dummy rifle grenade could 
be used to hoist the aerial onto a tree to make it less conspicuous.23 
The receiver covered a wider band of 200 to 600 metres (500 kHz 
to 1.5 MHz). A six-man carrying party moved the 31-lb set, along 
with accumulators (rechargeable batteries), masts, aerial wire, earth 
mats (simulated ground connections for aerials) and gear; a combined 
station weight of about 150 lb. Keeping exposed masts standing during 
shellfire was almost impossible. A station would resort to insulated 
19  Hall, “The British Army and Wireless Communication,” 291.
20  Stationery Service (SS) 141 Communication by Wireless, March 1918, RG24-C-
6-k, Volume 22022, LAC.
21  Bullock and Lyons, Missed Signals on the Western Front, 46. The BF set was 
trialled at the Battle of Loos.
22  A century ago, electromagnetic waves were expressed in wavelengths. The higher 
the frequency (Hertz), the shorter the wavelength (metres).
23  Technical Instructions No. 7, Wireless Trench Set, D.C. 50 Watts, April 1918, 
RG24-C-6-k, Volume 22020, LAC.
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ground aerials, which reduced its operational range.24 A shell’s thump 
outside the station’s dugout could knock the adjustment off course.25
In mid-1915, the 130-watt Wilson set containing a spark 
transmitter for use as a directing station (control station) at army, 
corps and divisional headquarters replaced the Pack set.26 A three-
man crew operated it on one of three wavelengths: 350, 450 or 550 
metres. The range from a BF set to a Wilson set was about 7,000 
yards and Wilson set to Wilson set 9,000 yards. The aerial wire 
length was 55 yards for 350 metres, 75 yards for 450 metres and 95 
yards for 550 metres, supported by 45 to 70 foot masts. As directing 
stations, the tuning had to be sharp. The Mk. III Short Wave Tuner 
received on 100 to 700 metre wavelengths. An aerial 60 to 100 yards 
long hung on two 30-foot steel tubular masts.27 
The army directing station maintained a separate aerial and 
receiving set for each wavelength allotted to a corps. A corps directing 
station (averaging 5 to 15 miles behind the front line) controlled 
subordinate stations. It assisted when they missed calls and acted 
as a divisional headquarters station when one was temporarily out of 
action, transmitting directly to a brigade station.28 Each division was 
in close liaison with its advanced divisional headquarters, brigades, 
artillery and flanking divisions. 
A directing station could impose controlled working: one in a 
group of stations was ordered to stop transmitting if another had 
an urgent message to send. When this proved impossible owing to 
interference, the chief directing station operator would choose period 
working by setting time periods (typically five minutes). The other 
stations would conform exactly, taking their turns.29 A wireless 
24  Basil Schonland, “W/T. R.E.: An Account of the Work and Development of Field 
Wireless Sets with the Armies in France,” The Wireless World 7, 76 (July 1919): 176.
25  The Germans captured the BF set, repackaging it as a Telefunken trench set. See 
Schonland, “W/T. R.E.,” 7, 76 (July 1919): 176.
26  Raymond Priestley, Work of R.E. in the European War, 1914-19: The Signal 
Service (France) (Chatham, UK: W & J Mackay, 1921; reprint, Uckfield, UK: Naval 
& Military Press, 2006), 87.
27  Technical Instructions No. 8 Wilson W/T Transmitting Set, April 1918, RG24-
C-6-k, Volume 22020, LAC; and SS 141 Communication by Wireless, March 1918, 
LAC.
28  Technical Instructions No. 6 Control of Wireless Communication, February 1918, 
RG24-C-6-k, Volume 22020, LAC.
29  SS 209 Handbook of Procedure Wireless Telegraphy, March 1918, RG24-C-6-k, 
Volume 22022, LAC; and Handbook of Procedure For Use With Wireless Signal 
Stations in the Army, 1912, RG24-C-6-k, Volume 22020, LAC.
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operator would transmit as many messages as possible before losing 
priority. The operator would then continue to listen for any emergency 
calls.30 The divisional, corps or army directing station corrected 
any problems arising from jamming (interference from an enemy or 
neighbour’s transmitter).31 Operators also watched for carelessness in 
enciphering, kept stations on their proper wavelengths, assisted with 
their more powerful sets and checked messages sent in clear (not 
enciphered).32 Careful monitoring exposed procedural mistakes and 
ensured all operators observed protocol.33 
The 20-watt Loop set, for forward area communications between 
brigades and battalions and between battalions and companies, 
was introduced in 1917. Its 74-lb front set and 82-lb rear set each 
contained a transmitter, receiver, accumulator (fully recharged after 
thirty-six hours) and aerials. A three-man crew carried the front 
set. Its diamond-shaped transmitting aerial, or loop (four light brass 
collapsible rods), was attached to a small ebonite box containing 
the transmitter’s spark-gap and condenser. This was clipped onto a 
bayonet driven into the ground, with a cable leading to the operator 
20 feet away at the transmitter.34 The transmitting loop could be 
completely screened from enemy observation when placed in a shell 
hole, trench or dug-out with little weakening of signal strength. Its 
receiving aerial (made from two 35-foot insulated-wire lengths) was 
tossed on the ground from the shell hole or trench. The rear Loop 
set’s aerial (35 to 60 feet long supported on two 4-foot tripod masts) 
handled transmissions and receptions.35 Several aerials were erected 
for a spark set when shelling was intense. These true short-wave sets 
worked on a fixed wavelength of 65 or 80 metres (4.615 or 3.750 MHz) 
with a 2,000 to 4,000 yard range. A rear set operator could be as far 
30  Bertram Neyland, “A Wireless Operator,” in Everyman At War: Sixty Personal 
Narratives of the War, ed. C.B. Purdom (London: J.M. Dent & Sons, 1930), 107-13.
31  Jamming became disruptive when a Loop set and a BF set were 500 yards apart. 
See Signalling Notes No. 16, RG9 III-C-5, Volume 4443, Folder 7, File 3, LAC.
32  In the Canadian Corps, wireless messages could only be sent in clear for SOS 
alerts, artillery reports for ranging or knowledge about fleeting targets, plus messages 
containing less than five words. See Wireless Messages, 18 September 1918, 3rd 
Canadian Division, RG9 III-C-5, Volume 4388, Folder 16, File 15, LAC. For an 
example of a simple substitution cipher, see Appendix A: Substitution Cipher Using 
Keyword.
33  Schonland, “W/T. R.E.,” 7, 79 (October 1919): 395.
34  Schonland, “W/T. R.E.,” 7, 80 (November 1919): 452. 
35  SS 141 Communication by Wireless, March 1918, LAC; and SS 191 Inter-
Communication in the Field, November 1917, RG24-C-6-k, Volume 22000, LAC. 
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as 25 to 30 feet from the aerial. BF set transmitters could disrupt 
Loop set communication and Loop set receivers could be jammed by 
interference from nearby telephones. 
The Power Buzzer (Earth Induction set), while not strictly a 
W/T set, was sufficiently similar in its method of earth induction 
telegraphy to be classified as a wireless apparatus. Small pulsating 
currents passed into the ground from a battery-driven induction 
coil by two insulated field cable lengths laid along the ground. Each 
of these wires was connected to the induction coil at one end and 
to an iron earth-pin hammered into the ground at the other. The 
current impulses were received at a second set of earth-pins and leads 
connected to a powerful vacuum tube (thermionic valve) Amplifier, 
which magnified the incoming signals.36 The range between Power 
36  In 1918 British Intelligence agents sabotaged Germany’s wireless receiving station 
in Mexico City by destroying all the receiver’s vacuum tubes. See Jonathan Winkler, 
“Information Warfare in World War 1,” The Journal of Military History 73, 3 (July 
2009): 854.
The transmitter and receiver of a Rear Station Mk II Wireless Telegraph Set Forward Spark 20 
watt B (“Loop Set”). [Joe Costello, RCSigs.ca]
8
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Buzzer and Amplifier could extend from 2,000 to over 4,000 yards, 
depending on the soil’s conductivity.37
The Power Buzzer, adapted from the French Parleur instrument, 
weighed 7 lb and its 26-lb accumulator provided fourteen hours 
continuous work. The Amplifier (accumulators, boxes and cables) 
weighed 130 lb. Signallers transmitted in code—substituting a 
numerical or alphabetical code word for a plaintext word—as the 
enemy could intercept and overhear the messages.38 The Amplifier 
could not transmit so the Power Buzzer would repeat the message until 
a signaller at the Amplifier acknowledged receipt using a “flapper” 
or a rocket.39 British Signal officer Reginald Nalder argued that a 
lighter form of the Power Buzzer-Amplifier, in sufficient quantities for 
battalion use, would have been worth more than spark wireless sets.40
The CW Trench Set Mk. I, designed in 1916, was introduced in 
1917 after undergoing modifications.41 CW was a “continuous, almost 
pure, [electromagnetic] sinusoidal waveform that was produced by 
keying” an oscillating triode vacuum tube.42 Poulsen oscillating arcs 
and radio-frequency alternators also generated CW. Lighter and more 
portable than a spark set, a CW set worked from lower masts and 
shorter aerials, giving a greater transmission range with much less 
power expenditure, resulting in more effective use of the spectrum. 
Sharp tuning permitted four times more sets to operate in a given 
area without interfering with one another.43 Although Telefunken had 
developed radio-frequency alternators by 1914, the Germans failed 
37  Steel, “Wireless Telegraphy,” 7, 1 (October 1929): 45; and Technical Instructions 
No. 5, Power Buzzer-Amplifier, November 1917, RG24-C-6-k, Volume 22020, LAC.
38  SS 148 Forward Inter-Communication in Battle, March 1917, 25, RG24-C-6-k, 
Volume 22000, LAC.
39  WD, 2nd Canadian Divisional Signal Company, April 1917, RG9 III-D-3, Volume 
5005, File 690, LAC; and Military Operations France and Belgium 1917 Volume 1: 
Appendices (London: MacMillan, 1940), Appendix 12, Section 5.
40  Reginald Nalder, The Royal Corps of Signals: A History of its Antecedents and 
Development (London: Royal Signals Institution, 1958), 130.
41  A.G.T. Cusins, “Development of Army Wireless During the War,” IEE Journal 
59, 303 (July 1921): 766.
42  Hall, Communications and British Operations on the Western Front, 100.
43  Steel, “Wireless Telegraphy,” 7, 1 (October 1929): 50.
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to deploy vacuum tube CW sets.44 A captured German document 
disclosed the British had secured the lead with CW-driven aircraft 
communications.45
The 30-watt CW Trench Set Mk. III transmitted and received on 
450 to 1,450 metre (207 to 667 kHz) wavelengths. Its 20 to 100 foot-
long aerial was suspended 2 to 4 feet above ground for forward work, 
with ranges from 4,000 to 6,000 yards.46 A six-man party carried 
the seven boxes (transmitter, high tension unit, receiver, selector, 
wavemeter and batteries), earphones, earth mat, masts, aerial reels 
and spare vacuum tubes.47 CW sets could send and receive without 
44  Hugh Aitken, The Continuous Wave: Technology and American Radio, 1900-1932 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), 251; and Steel, “Wireless Telegraphy,” 
7, 3 (April 1930): 369. Telefunken created a variant of the quenched spark-gap system 
that supposedly behaved closely to CW. See Peter Hugill, Global Communications 
since 1844: Geopolitics and Technology (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1999), 89-90.
45  T.V. Smith, “Wireless in the Royal Flying Corps During the War,” The Electrician 
83 (October 1919): 447.
46  Experimental work with high aerials extended the CW set Mk. III’s range up to 
100 miles. A 120-watt CW semi-portable set worked up to ranges of 200 miles. See 
The Work of the Royal Engineers in the European War, 1914-19: Supply of Engineer 
Stores and Equipment (Chatham: Secretary, RE Institute, n.d.), 64-65.
47  SS 191 Inter-Communication in the Field, November 1917, LAC; SS 141 
Communication by Wireless, March 1918, LAC; and W.T. Sets, Trench, Continuous 
Wave, April 1918, RG24-C-6-k, Volume 22020, LAC. Note: SS 191 included and 
revised SS 148.
W/T Sets Trench, CW, Mk. III. [Reproduced from W.T. Sets, Trench, Continuous Wave, April 1918]
10
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risk of jamming other wireless sets, but spark sets interfered with 
them. For example, a BF set transmitting within 500 yards could jam 
a CW set receiving messages. 
For a time, CW wireless remained almost entirely an artillery 
monopoly although a forward observation officer (FOO) could send 
urgent infantry-based messages. Furthermore, CW sets operated 
with anti-aircraft sections, tanks, scouting parties, Royal Air Force 
(RAF) ground stations (connecting brigades, wings and squadrons), 
the Canadian Independent Force (CIF) and the Canadian Corps 
Survey Section (CCSS). The corps directing station controlled both 
spark and CW wireless messaging. 
Had the Canadian Corps infantry been allotted the superior CW 
sets, they would have benefitted from reduced mutual interference on 
narrow fronts. Indeed, the paramount hindrance to CW operations 
was jamming from spark sets. Uninterrupted communications over 
longer distances to headquarters in the final months would have 
been attainable, thereby avoiding spark-based stepping-up stations 
and bridging the augmented gap between formations with visual 
signalling. GHQ policy mandated that artillery, not infantry, would 
deploy CW wireless equipment in 1917. The artillery’s long-range 
networks demanded the greater ranges obtainable by CW sets. 
Finally on 26 October 1918, a CW set Mk. III at the Canadian Corps 
Set Technology Power (Watts)
Range 
(yards)
Frequency 
(metres)
Year 
Available
Mast 
Height (ft)
Station Weight 
(lbs)
BF Trench Set spark 50 4,000 350, 450, 550 1915 15 150
Wilson Set spark 130
7,000 to BF 
set; 9,000 to 
Wilson set
350, 450, 
550 1915 45-70
140 (includes 
Mk. III Tuner)
Loop Set spark 20 2,000 - 4,000 65, 80 1917 4 74 front station, 82 rear station
Woolwich Mk. I 
Trench Set
continuous 
wave 30 8,800 500-1,400 1917 15 unknown
Mk. III Trench 
Set
continuous 
wave 30 4,000 - 6,000 450-1,450 1917 2–4 175
i Compiled from Technical Instructions No. 7 Wireless Trench Set, D.C. 50 Watts , April 1918, LAC; Technical Instructions No. 
8 Wilson W/T Transmitting Set , April 1918, LAC; SS 141 Communication by Wireless , March 1918, LAC; and W.T. Sets, 
Trench, Continuous Wave , April 1918, LAC.
Table 1. Characteristics of Canadian-deployed W/T sets on the Western Fronti
Range varies depending on length and height of aerial.
11
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message centre began operating between the corps and army and also 
to divisional artilleries.48
w/t networks and their drawbacks
A network, in conjunction with the field telephone and telegraph 
cable grid, operated from the safely ensconced army headquarters 
to the hostile environment of battalion headquarters, forming the 
military’s wireless chain of intercommunications.49 This hierarchical 
network conveyed orders forward, percolated information back to 
parent formations and ensured cooperation of all arms and units.50 
W/T made communications viable between any two points within 
the operational range of sets, regardless of topography. Raymond 
Priestley maintained W/T was the critically important alternative 
communication method to the rear of battalion headquarters.51 
Indeed, “[t]he most serious deficiency in the Great War was an 
effective battalion rear link to brigade.”52 In his final despatch, 
Field Marshal Douglas Haig acknowledged wireless communication 
integration into the Signal establishment, albeit down to divisions.53 
The infantry’s spark-based grid was a hodgepodge: a 1,500-watt 
Motor Lorry set at army headquarters, Wilson sets transmitting 
between corps and divisional headquarters, brigade BF sets working 
back to divisional headquarters and either Loop sets or a Power 
Buzzer and Amplifier operating between brigade and battalion 
headquarters. Each Canadian division was issued twelve Loop sets 
in early August 1917.54 Each brigade kept two Loop sets for forward 
48  In October 1918, a British division attempted to obtain a CW set from British 
Heavy Artillery. See Report on the Operations of the 63rd (RN) Division, RG9 
III-C-1, Volume 3856, Folder 78, File 10, LAC.
49  German army and corps headquarters W/T station ranges were 200 and 60 miles 
respectively. Each divisional sector maintained a wireless detachment consisting of: a 
station, an infantry section with thirteen portable sets and an artillery section with 
twelve portable sets. See Anon, German Army Handbook, April 1918 (London: Arms 
and Armour Press, 1977), 119-20. In February 1918, each division added a wireless 
battalion of two platoons. 
50  SS 148 Forward Inter-Communication in Battle, March 1917, 3, LAC.
51  Priestley, Work of R.E. in the European War, 325.
52  Crawshaw, “The Impact of Technology on the BEF and its Commander,” 175.
53  Sir Douglas Haig’s Despatches, ed. J.H. Boraston (London: J.M. Dent, 1920), 334.
54  4th Canadian Infantry Brigade, 5 August 1917, RG9 III-C-3, Volume 4112, Folder 
40, File 1, LAC.
12
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work. Advanced corps, divisional and brigade headquarters, together 
with forward communications centres, report centres, message 
centres, rear command posts and lateral links to flanking formations 
at each command level were merged into the static network. Each 
corps was allocated one of three wavelengths (350, 450 or 550 metres) 
for spark set operation.55 In 1918, the Canadian Corps maintained 
thirty-four CW, thirty-two Loop, twenty BF and twenty-four Power 
Buzzer-Amplifier stations.56 
CW sets operated at field and heavy artillery headquarters 
with connections to brigade and battery headquarters and to 
observation posts. Initially, CW sets were primarily assigned for 
forward observation work directing artillery fire, due in part to their 
inconspicuous aerials. Flash spotting messages were conveyed by 
wireless to batteries. The artillery’s counter-battery CW network 
included aircraft transmitting to Field Artillery (FA) Observation 
Posts (OPs), which communicated with FA brigades and divisional 
artillery, which in turn corresponded with Corps Artillery. Airplane 
messages were also transmitted to Heavy Artillery (HA) OPs, then 
up the line to HA Brigades to the HA Counter-Battery Staff Officer 
and to Corps Artillery.57 
Wireless technology had technical limitations and vulnerabilities. 
Bursting shells jarred a receiver’s crystal detector, freezing weather 
wrecked steel masts and sets required a reasonably dry dugout. Lack 
of spare parts left damaged sets irreparable, requiring replacement. 
Sets were inoperative while awaiting recharged batteries (often a daily 
requirement). Charging plants and battery dumps could be exposed 
to shell fire. Aerials had to be maintained at all costs. The CW 
operator’s repair skills were indispensable as “[t]here were literally 
dozens of ways in which the [early] sets might go wrong.”58  A lack 
of adequate transportation was a critical ongoing obstacle to efficient 
wireless communication. Transportation for CW stations was often 
unsuitable, necessitating retuning, overhauling or exchanging the 
delicate sets. Mattress springs were sometimes used to counter the 
shaking. BF and Loop sets—sent forward in an assault once an 
55  Schonland,” W/T. R.E.,” 7, 79 (October 1919): 395.
56  Report of the Ministry: Overseas Military Forces of Canada 1918 (London: The 
Ministry, Overseas Military Forces of Canada, c1919), 265.
57  Andrew McNaughton, “Counter Battery Work,” Canadian Defence Quarterly 3, 
4 (July 1926): Appendix B.
58  Priestley, Work of R.E. in the European War, 226.
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objective had been captured—were not lightweight and Loop sets 
were useless in certain atmospheric conditions. Weary men could not 
carry cumbersome apparatus after long marches. Carrying party 
casualties meant delivery of incomplete sets. All CW devices were 
vacuum-tube based as were listening set amplifiers, navy and air 
force equipment. Vacuum tubes were difficult to produce and wartime 
demands severely strained their manufacture, creating a vacuum tube 
production crisis in 1918.59
According to the General Staff-issued pamphlet SS 148, during 
an attack a BF set could be employed at the Advanced Brigade 
Headquarters to communicate to its flanking brigades and divisional 
headquarters. A battalion forward command post during an attack 
would communicate with its companies and brigade using signallers, 
runners and a “pigeoneer.” It was inadvisable to carry a BF set further 
than the Advanced Brigade Headquarters unless the equipment 
could be shielded from view.60 Shellfire often wrecked exposed aerials 
and masts and commanders were fearful of interceptions at the 
“information-gathering edge.”61 
The edict to encipher insecure wireless messages prevented swift 
circulation of critical real-time information to headquarters staff, 
impeding decision making especially once battle conditions had 
changed. The lack of skilled telegraphers and operators poorly trained 
in cipher further delayed deliveries. In fact, standing orders specified 
that messages be enciphered by the sender and deciphered by the 
addressee. However, it was common practice for operators to handle 
the ciphering, an impossible task during heavy traffic. The effort 
to encipher was of questionable worth considering that the enemy 
would usually decipher messages within six hours.62 Ironically, larger 
amounts of wireless traffic assisted the enemy in solving the ciphers 
and codes.
However, W/T’s susceptibility to interception was also shared by 
other communication technologies. The field telephone, for example, 
59  Brian Hall, “Missed Signals? A reply to Mike Bullock and Laurence A. Lyons,” 
British Journal for Military History 4, 3 (2018): 27; Blond, “Technology and 
Tradition,” 129; and Guy Hartcup, The War of Invention: Scientific Developments, 
1914-18 (London: Brassey’s Defence Publishers, 1988), 155.
60  SS 148 Forward Inter-Communication in Battle, March 1917, 8, 15, 22, LAC. 
61  Bidwell, Modern Warfare, 86. 
62  Maj.-Gen. W.H. Anderson, memo, 28 May 1918, RG9 III-C-5, Volume 4384, 
Folder 3, File 7, LAC. 
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was also at risk and its use was regulated in the wired battlefield’s 
danger zone—the 3,000 yards extending behind the front lines 
where enemy listening sets could intercept telephonic conversations, 
telegraphic buzzer messages and Power Buzzer messages.63 There were 
two types of telephonic circuits. The “double line” or twisted cable 
metallic circuit permitted the current to flow out along one line and 
back along another. The current in a “single line” or “earth return” 
circuit coursed through a field cable from the sender’s telephone to 
the receiver’s telephone and, instead of using a second cable, was 
returned via an earth-pin at the receiver to another earth-pin at 
the sender to complete the circuit. Unfortunately, the current leaked 
from the earth-pins, radiating in all directions and from inadequately 
insulated or bare segments of cable, or by electromagnetic induction. 
Interception, of course, was a two-way street. To eavesdrop on 
enemy telephone conversations, earth-pins driven into the ground 
were attached to buried cables meandering back to dug-outs housing 
tuners and amplifiers, which magnified telephonic and Power Buzzer 
return earth currents. The cable could also be attached to the 
enemy’s barbed wire. Alternatively, looped wire positioned parallel 
to the enemy’s cable used induction to acquire the information. The 
listening station was known as IT, referring to Intelligence Telephone, 
or IToc.64 In December 1916, the Canadians maintained two IToc 
sets to intercept German conversations and another two to police 
their own conversations.65 To ensure greater security, conversations 
(except for artillery observation and emergencies) were either banned 
or restricted in the danger zone. One monitored conversation in 
February 1917 involved a Canadian officer instructing the sender 
to divulge a situation report over the phone. The receiver refused 
it, as it was forbidden.66 Beginning in August 1917, W/T-based 
tuners and amplifiers were used to intercept enemy wireless traffic 
in close proximity to the Canadians. On 15 March 1918 an enemy 
wireless message, revealing complete plans for a raid against Hill 70, 
63  SS 191 Inter-communication in the Field, November 1917, 87, LAC.
64  The German equivalent was the Moritz station, which identified more “British 
units than all their other intelligence sources combined.” See Jim Beach and James 
Bruce, “British signals intelligence in the trenches, 1915-1918: part 1, listening sets,” 
Journal of Intelligence History 19, 1 (2020): 6.
65  Beach and Bruce, “British signals intelligence in the trenches, 1915-1918: part 1, 
listening sets,” 13.
66  No. 4 IT Set Reports, RG9 III-C-1, Volume 3837, Folder 29, File 1, LAC.
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was intercepted and deciphered. The information sent to the 12th 
Canadian Infantry Brigade allowed enough time to prepare and repel 
the attack successfully.67
Interception of both wireline and wireless communications 
necessitated encoding and enciphering sensitive traffic at the front. 
These restrictions reduced the risk of interception but proved to be a 
time-delaying drawback on the battlefield.
canadian operations on the western front: how w/t was 
applied on the battlefield
First Canadian Divisional Signal Company sappers inaugurated the 
Canadian wireless service in spring 1915. They built a receiving set 
and operated a press bureau, passing on wireless press reports from 
England and France and propaganda from other countries.68 The 
2nd Canadian Divisional Signal Company was the first to handle 
wireless battle-related messages in March 1916. That same month, 
Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry Captain John Van 
den Berg used a field telephone to contact wireless stations, which 
forwarded his encoded directions for controlling machine gun fire. 
In May, fire directions were transmitted 6,000 yards from an OP 
to a 9.2 inch howitzer siege battery in the Ypres salient using BF 
sets—the first instance of wireless-directed artillery spotting in the 
Canadian Corps.69 
During the Battle of Mount Sorrel’s opening day, 2 June 1916—
after most telephone lines had been down for hours—wireless 
messages were transmitted. A forward wireless set in Sanctuary 
Wood fell silent; its broken aerials could not be replaced under the 
heavy bombardment. The message “urgent need for reinforcements” 
sent at 1 p.m. from the 4th CMR to 3rd Brigade via pigeon and then 
67  Steel, “Wireless Telegraphy,” 7, 3 (April 1930): 365, 366, 369. Possibly the first 
instance of a Canadian intercepting a German wireless message occurred in Canada. 
An official communication in clear from the German Embassy in Washington, DC 
to the German Foreign Office in Berlin was inadvertently intercepted in northern 
Québec on 3 August 1914, the evening before the outbreak of war. As a result, a 
German gun-mounted ship was interned for the duration in the USA. See Charles 
Winter, 20 November 1936, RG24-C-6-e, Volume 1837, File GAQ-9-34, LAC.
68  Steel, “Wireless Telegraphy,” 6, 4 (July 1929): 445.
69  Steel, “Wireless Telegraphy,” 6, 4 (July 1929): 450.
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wireless took forty-eight minutes. One brigade-to-division ciphered 
wireless message of about 160 words took over four hours to reach its 
destination.70 
The Canadians operated two sets in the Pozières area on the 
Somme battlefield in August 1916. After the Sugar Factory was 
captured on 15 September, one BF set handled twelve important 
messages to brigade and division. The BF station was moved forward 
for the attack on Courcelette that afternoon and handled substantial 
traffic for the next nine days.71 An artillery observer messaged his 
batteries via a German set found at the Sugar Factory.72 During the 
entire 141-day Battle of the Somme, wireless stations transmitted 
about 4,000 messages, a meagre twenty-eight messages per day.73 
Maj.-Gen. Richard Turner, 2nd Canadian Division, ranked wireless 
communications last after telephone, visual signaling and pigeons.74 
Regardless of method, during static warfare orders despatched 
from the Corps could take six hours or more to reach company 
commanders.75 By comparison, a German-delivered message on the 
Somme took between eight and ten hours to pass between divisional 
headquarters and the front line.76 
The seven communications methods at Vimy Ridge in April 1917 
were telephones, aircraft contact patrol, visual signalling, pigeons, 
runners, Power Buzzer-Amplifiers and W/T stations.77 BF sets were 
70  WD, Canadian Corps Signal Company, 2-3 June 1916, Appendix B, RG9 III-D-3, 
Volume 5004, File 687, LAC.
71  Steel, “Wireless Telegraphy,” 6, 4 (July 1929): 452-54.
72  WD, 21st Canadian Battalion, Operations 21st Canadian Battalion, September 
1916, RG9 III-D-3, Volume 4930, File 410, LAC.
73  Section IV, SS 141 Notes on Wireless, February 1917, RG24-C-6-k, Volume 22022, 
LAC.
74  David Campbell, “The Divisional Experience in the C.E.F.: A Social and 
Operational History of the 2nd Canadian Division, 1915-1918” (PhD dissertation, 
University of Calgary, 2003), 256.
75  SS 119 Preliminary Notes on the Tactical Lessons of the Recent Operations, July 
1916, 7, REF TECH UB 251 G7 P7 1916, Canadian War Museum Military History 
Research Centre [CWM MHRC]. At the Somme in October 1916, the distance from 
Canadian Corps HQ to the 1st Division HQ was 17,500 yards, from 1st Division HQ 
to 1st Brigade HQ 4,375 yards and from 1st Brigade HQ to the 4th Battalion HQ 
4,375 yards. See William Stewart, Canadians on the Somme, 1916: The Neglected 
Campaign (Solihull, UK: Helion & Company, 2017), Map booklet, Map S.2. 
76  David Zabecki, The German 1918 Offensives: A case study in the operational level 
of war (New York, NY: Routledge, 2009), 66. 
77  Duncan Macintyre, Canada at Vimy (Toronto: Peter Martin Associates, 1967), 
90-91.
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operational at the 1st Canadian Divisional report centre and at 2nd 
and 3rd Brigade headquarters, one in the Bentata subway.78 Shell 
fire destroyed the 2nd Canadian Infantry Brigade’s Power Buzzer 
and killed its operators. On the 2nd Canadian Divisional front, 
electromagnetic induction from buried telephone circuits jammed 
the Amplifiers. One of their two BF sets worked from inside Zivy 
Cave. Two BF sets were used on the 3rd Canadian Division’s front. 
The 4th Canadian Division’s two BF sets (one near Souchez and 
the other in the Tottenham Subway) and Power Buzzers readied for 
emergencies were never used. Spark wireless was underutilised, being 
non-essential at Vimy Ridge because well-maintained telephone and 
telegraph connections remained uninterrupted.79 
Two British Heavy Artillery Groups at Vimy Ridge were allotted 
four CW sets, two forward and two rear. British and Canadian 
signallers operated these four field sets, transmitting on a 1,000-metre 
wavelength. No jamming occurred at the OP stations with the 
forward sets operating on 5-foot-high masts. The rear stations, 8,000 
yards away, used 30-foot-high masts. FOOs despatched runners to 
the OPs, where CW wireless signallers relayed their messages with 
directions and attack status to the heavy guns.80 
In preparation for the Battle of Hill 70, the first wireless Canadian 
gun registration occurred in late July 1917. CW wireless issued all 
messages and corrections to the artillery exchange at Bully-Grenay.81 
Canadian Corps Heavy Artillery (CCHA) counter-battery groups 
operated four CW sets. Signallers at fixed OPs relayed German 
troop movement and battery locations to Canadian gunners.82 With 
ongoing disruptions to lines, a CW set on Hill 70 (Ascot OP) handled 
SOS calls every day. Wireless continued to be used as an emergency, 
78  A report centre was a forward collection station for ties between infantry, artillery 
and other formations.
79  WD, 1st Canadian Divisional Signal Company, April 1917, RG9 III-D-3, Volume 
5004, File 689, LAC; WD, 2nd Canadian Divisional Signal Company, April 1917, 
RG9 III-D-3, Volume 5005, File 690, LAC; WD, 4th Canadian Divisional Signal 
Company, April 1917, RG9 III-D-3, Volume 5005, File 693, LAC; and Steel, “Wireless 
Telegraphy,” 6, 4 (July 1929): 458.
80  Steel, “Wireless Telegraphy,” 7, 1 (October 1929): 50-51.
81  Steel, “Wireless Telegraphy,” 7, 1 (October 1929): 51.
82  Dan Jenkins, “Winning Trench Warfare: Battlefield Intelligence in the Canadian 
Corps, 1914-1918” (PhD dissertation, Carleton University, 1999), 295.
18
Canadian Military History, Vol. 29 [2020], Iss. 2, Art. 5
https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol29/iss2/5
  19PA S C A S 
rather than alternative, communication medium. For instance, a 
Wilson set handled only CCHA emergencies.83 
Canadian infantry and artillery operated spark and CW wireless 
stations at Passchendaele. On 25 October, a direct hit destroyed the 
forward corps directing station in a dugout north of Menin Gate. A 
shell destroyed another near Zonnebeke after the enemy located it 
with a compass set (a listening station to detect an enemy’s set).84 
1st Canadian Divisional headquarters remained in wireless contact 
with one brigade at Gallipoli Heights, southeast of Gravenstafel. 
A directing station’s Wilson set established communication with 
forward BF sets although jamming seriously disrupted transmissions. 
The attacking battalions carried Power Buzzers in November, but the 
Amplifiers’ unsuitable accommodations led to disappointing results. 
83  WD, 1st Canadian Divisional Signal Company, August 1917, LAC; and WD, 
Canadian Corps Signal Company, August 1917, LAC. 
84  Steel, “Wireless Telegraphy,” 7, 4 (July 1930): 463.
Major wireless telegraphy stations in the Canadian Corps zone circa early February 1918. 
[Reproduced from LAC RG9 III-C-5, Volume 4436, Folder 2, File 2]
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A 4th Canadian Divisional wireless aerial attracted fire.85 Lieut.-Col. 
Elroy Forde, Assistant Director of Signals, reported that 3rd and 4th 
Canadian Divisional Signal Company stations had not received any 
calls for over three days.86 
To test CW effectiveness, three stations were assigned to receive 
CCHA FOOs’ reports from Passchendaele: a rear station at CCHA 
headquarters in the Vlamertinghe Château, a combined spark and 
CW station at divisional artillery headquarters at the Ypres Ramparts 
and a stepping-up (re-transmission) station at Gallipoli Heights. On 6 
November, under an intense enemy barrage, the wireless team arrived 
at the Crossroads in Passchendaele at 9:10 a.m. with the forward 
station. A Wilson transmitter, a Mk. III Receiver, a Woolwich CW 
set Mk. I (replaced seven times during the operation owing to rough 
handling) and a Carden CW set (for cavalry use) were assembled 
inside a pill-box. For redundancy, three aerials were erected, all in 
different directions, because they were shot down, on average, twenty 
times a day from continual shell fire.87 This counter-battery report 
centre coordinated artillery fire and also handled infantry messages. 
Spark wireless was rendered inoperable from jamming, faulty aerials 
and concentrated shelling. It was abandoned. Four hours after 
transmitting a message from the Woolwich CW set, a reply was 
finally received from the divisional CW set, about 11,000 yards 
away. Jamming from overhead aircraft transmitters and enemy spark 
stations was intense, but the CW signal remained loud and clear. 
Seventy-three messages were sent during a ten-day period. After this 
test, “staff were now willing to consider wireless as an integral part 
of the general scheme of communication.”88
85  WD, 1st Canadian Divisional Signal Company, October-November 1917, 
LAC; WD, 2nd Canadian Divisional Signal Company, October-November 1917, 
RG9 III-D-3, Volume 5005, File 691, LAC; WD, 3rd Canadian Divisional Signal 
Company, October-November 1917, RG9 III-D-3, Volume 5005, File 692, LAC; WD, 
4th Canadian Divisional Signal Company, October-November 1917, LAC; and WD, 
Canadian Corps Signal Company, October-November 1917, LAC. Occasionally, 
aerials were raised or left as decoys.
86  A.D. Signals, memo, 31 October 1917, RG9 III-C-1, Volume 3854, Folder 71, File 
8, LAC. 
87  A German prisoner stated that the 1917 Battle of Messines’ bombardment forced 
them to erect a ground aerial for every message sent. See Review of Enemy Wireless 
in Battle of Messines June 1st to 21st, 1917, MG30-E61, Volume 13, Folder 88, LAC. 
88  Steel, “Wireless Telegraphy,” 7, 4 (July 1930): 458-62; and WD, General Officer 
Commanding [GOC] Royal Artillery [RA], Canadian Corps Artillery Report, 
December 1917, RG9 III-D-3, Volume 4957, File 504, LAC.
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On 7 November, Lieut.-Col. Andrew McNaughton forwarded 
a test message simultaneously by wireless and pigeon to CCHA 
headquarters. The CW message, undoubtedly short and in clear, was 
received at headquarters less than five minutes after being handed 
in, before the pigeon had even left the pill box.89 Nevertheless, pigeon 
service in 1917 was deemed more feasible than forward wireless.90 
The Canadian Signalling School had been established in March 
1917 in Sussex, England. Divisional CW wireless detachments for 
field artillery were established in early 1918 along with a CW field 
artillery school. Reorganisation of the Canadian Corps Signal Service 
was initiated in February 1918. An officer dedicated to wireless 
duties was added to each divisional signal company and additional 
transport was assigned for wireless equipment.91 That same month, 
an extra Wilson set was secured for each division along with the 
formation of Brigade Buzzer and Loop set pools. By March, fifty-
seven operators from artillery units had been trained in CW wireless. 
Between May and July, training schools were run for divisional W/T 
sections. The Canadian Corps Wireless School was established in 
June as part of the Canadian Corps Signal School in France. In 
July, W/T sections were reorganised and furnished with equipment. 
A special CW detachment was added to each division.92
In August 1918, each Canadian division at Amiens operated a 
Wilson-based directing station conversing with its brigades’ BF sets. 
The corps directing station at St. Fuscien controlled all divisional 
and brigade traffic for over thirty-six hours. The forward station 
operated at the Corps report centre near Gentelles. The most wireless 
traffic (over 150 messages) occurred on 11 August while divisions 
were moving. Procedure called for advancing divisions to hand over 
their brigades’ communications to corps, but the additional traffic 
89  Steel, “Wireless Telegraphy,” 7, 4 (July 1930): 460. Curiously, during an interview 
in January 1963 for CBC’s Flanders’ Fields radio broadcast series, then 75-year-old 
McNaughton recalled the pigeon arrived at his headquarters in about thirty minutes 
whereas the wireless messages was received the next day. See John Swettenham, 
McNaughton: Volume 1 1887-1939 (Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1968), 115.
90  John Moir, History of the Royal Canadian Corps of Signals 1903-1961 (Ottawa: 
Corps Committee Royal Canadian Corps of Signals, 1962), 28. 
91  Extracts from Correspondence re Re-organization of Signal Service, February 
1918, RG9 III-C-5, Volume 4443, Folder 7, File 3, LAC.
92  Major Donald White, 4 March 1918, RG9 III-C-3, Volume 4022, Folder 53, File 5, 
LAC; and Steel, “Wireless Telegraphy,” 7, 4 (July 1930): 464-67.
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became excessive—especially before new cabling was installed—
when two divisions were on the move.  
The Canadian Corps Signal Company was responsible for 
communications with flanking corps, divisions, heavy artillery, RAF 
squadrons, kite balloons sections, survey sections and anti-aircraft 
sections. It handled 1,423 wireless messages from 8 to 19 August from 
Corps Headquarters, the CCHA, the CIF and Liaison.93 Canadian 
Corps headquarters exchanged situation reports with the French 31st 
Corps over CW wireless while staying in touch with the Australian 
Corps over spark wireless. 
The 1st Canadian Divisional Wilson station communicated with 
its brigades, corps and flanking divisions, transmitting 95 per cent of 
157 messages in clear from 8 to 12 August.94 Throughout 8 August, 
2nd Canadian Divisional wireless communication was hampered by 
numerous sets jamming at the front. The 3rd Canadian Division’s 
close proximity to its brigades that day meant little wireless work 
initially. Later, they averaged forty messages daily from 12 to 15 
August. The 4th Canadian Divisional Wilson station messaged the 
corps directing station for four hours non-stop on the 8th, blocking 
the other three divisions.95 Of the 5,580 messages the 4th Canadian 
Divisional signallers handled from 8 to 15 August, only 250 were 
wireless.96 
Although much jamming occurred and constant adjustments 
were required, “[w]ith the dislocation of the telephone and telegraph 
service during the greater part of the first day, … wireless as a means 
of communication for the first time in the history of the Corps 
became a most valuable asset.”97 Other methods had faltered—
linesmen could not locate headquarters and runners were lost in the 
fog. Undoubtedly, W/T sets were effective for temporary military 
93   Steel, “Wireless Telegraphy,” 8, 1 (October 1930): 92.
94  WD, Report 1st Canadian Division, 1st Canadian Division Report on Amiens 
Operation Aug. 8th-20th Inclusive 1918, Appendix G, Signal Communications, 
August 1918, RG9 III-D-3, Folder 5059, File 968, LAC.
95  Part 2 page 9, Reports on Wireless Communication During Amiens Offensive, 
General Report On Wireless Telegraph Communications in the Canadian Corps 
From February 1915 To December 1918, 22 April 1919, Control No. 19801226-284, 
Textual Record 58A 1 61.7, CWM MHRC.
96  WD, 4th Canadian Divisional Signal Company, Communications, August 1918, 
LAC.
97  Canadian Signal Service with Canadian Corps in the Field, RG9 III-D-2, Volume 
4805, File 162, LAC. 
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communications when gaining the final objective.98 The sets were 
appreciated when units occupied a new location before telephone 
cables and airline routes (wire mounted on short poles) were laid.99 
Each divisional artillery headquarters exchanged CW-based 
messages with its brigades. Brig.-Maj. A. H. Bick, 1st Canadian 
Divisional Artillery, claimed CW wireless was the only dependable 
means of communication between mobile artillery units and artillery 
headquarters. CW operators were able to transmit information 
back to headquarters in under thirty minutes after securing a new 
position.100 The 2nd Divisional Artillery reported that CW wireless 
sets were underutilised because the telephone lines held out. Later, 
the advance was too rapid to use the sets owing to their range 
limitations and need for dedicated transport.101 The 4th Divisional 
Artillery’s two replacement CW sets were successfully used between 
their headquarters and brigade headquarters. None of the Royal 
Field Artillery or the Australian Field Artillery seconded to the 4th 
Divisional Artillery was equipped with CW wireless.102
Four CW sets Mk. III performed flash spotting and forward 
observation work for the CCSS, which believed it was the first 
Allied formation to carry on flash spotting with CW wireless as the 
sole means of communication.103 In twelve days, its three forward 
stations transmitted over 20,000 words where the distance from the 
OPs to the CCHA averaged 9,000 yards. CW wireless flash spotting 
was found to be superior to telephone flash spotting according to 
98  WD, 2nd Canadian Divisional Signal Company, August 1918, RG9 III-D-3, 
Volume 5005, File 691, LAC; and WD, 4th Canadian Divisional Signal Company, 
August 1918, LAC.
99  The 4th Division’s brigade and battalion sets were not properly adjusted, having 
been in use only a short time. See WD, 4th Canadian Division, Appendix 1, August 
1918, RG9 III-D-3, Volume 4861, File 164, LAC.
100  Arthur Bick, The Diary of an Artillery Office: The 1st Canadian Divisional 
Artillery on the Western Front, ed. Peter Bick (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 2011), 111.
101  WD, GOC RA, Canadian Corps, 2nd Canadian Divisional Artillery, Report on 
Operations, August 1918, LAC. 
102  WD, GOC RA, Canadian Corps, 4th Canadian Divisional Artillery, 
Communications during Recent Operations, August 1918, LAC.
103  Artillery Observation Section, 20 August 1918, RG9 III-C-1, Volume 3925, Folder 
17, File 12, LAC; and WD, Canadian Corps Survey Section, August, 1918, RG9 
III-D-3, Volume 5005, File 697, LAC.
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Forde. Conversely, McNaughton claimed wireless was “a temporary 
expedient” to telephone flash spotting.104 
Brig.-Gen. Raymond Brutinel’s CIF infiltrated behind the 
German lines on 8 August.105 Their CW set Mk. III, mounted in an 
armoured car, transmitted in clear on a wavelength of 1,450 metres 
and later 1,260 metres to the rear set at the Corps report centre.106 
This set eventually broke down and the Corps CW liaison station 
stepped in: 
It appeared that all wireless stations within the Army had been 
listening in to this traffic in order to obtain a first hand [sic] story of 
the conditions in the enemy back country, since the Independent Force 
had penetrated very deeply into the German lines and the wireless was 
their only means of communication.107
The Signal Troop, Canadian Cavalry Brigade followed the Canadian 
Corps into battle on 8 August 1918. Shell fire partially destroyed 
their spark set, forcing them back to Cavalry Corps headquarters to 
refit.108 Wireless was in constant use since cable wagons could not 
keep up with the advancing cavalry. 
Each Canadian division at Amiens was allotted a Mark IV Baggage 
tank, from the 4th Tank Brigade, fitted with CW sets and spares.109 
The tanks were unable to keep pace. Three eventually developed 
engine trouble. Regardless, communications were maintained.110 
All infantry and artillery W/T tactical messaging in active 
operations should have been sent in clear. Flanking formations would 
have been aware of first-hand reports. Brig.-Gen. William Griesbach 
104  Report on Wireless Communications in the Canadian Corps Area, During the 
Offensive on the Amiens Front, August 8th-22nd, 1918, RG9 III-C-1, Volume 3923, 
Folder 10, File 6, LAC; and McNaughton, Counter Battery Work, 17, REF PAM UF 
26 M356, CWM MHRC.
105  The CIF operated from 8 to 27 August and from 1 to 4 September 1918. Brutinel’s 
Brigade operated from 28 to 31 August and from 19 September onward.
106  Report on Wireless Communications in the Canadian Corps Area, During the 
Offensive on the Amiens Front, August 8th-22nd, 1918, LAC.
107  Steel, “Wireless Telegraphy,” 8, 1 (October 1930): 91.
108  WD, Signal Troop Canadian Cavalry Brigade, 8 August 1918, RG9 III-D-3, 
Volume 5006, File 695, LAC. 
109  A spark transmitter set was designed specifically for Mark I tanks in 1916. By fall 
1917, CW had replaced spark.
110  4th Tank Brigade Report on Operations August 8th to 11th 1918, RG9 III-D-2, 
Volume 4798, File 102, LAC.
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believed that after Zero hour all messages should be forwarded in clear 
whereas others, fearful of interception, did not want wireless-initiated 
operational messages.111 Evidently, wireless traffic decreased when in 
clear messaging was forbidden. Wireless was invaluable to command 
centres, which required accurate information dissemination during 
continual advances and shifting of positions. Prompt transmission of 
battle conditions at this time outweighed the security risk. 
The Second Battles of Arras comprised the Battle of the Scarpe 
(26-30 August) and the Battle of the Drocourt-Quéant Line (2-3 
September). When the Canadians arrived in the area on 23 August, a 
loaned 1,500-watt Leyland Lorry set with 60-foot masts served as the 
main Canadian Corps directing station. A forward directing station 
was also erected. In the first two days, little spark wireless traffic 
transpired while brigades and divisions communicated over cable 
routes. The distance between battalion and brigade headquarters, as 
at Amiens, was too great for Loop set operation. A Wilson set served 
as the corps message station. Royal Garrison Artillery and Canadian 
personnel operated the CCHA’s eight CW sets while spark sets were 
erected at 18-pounder batteries. Canadian operators worked with the 
CCSS on flash spotting and forward observation.112 
During the Drocourt-Quéant battle, 1st and 4th Canadian 
Divisional headquarters’ Wilson stations communicated with brigade 
BF sets. The narrow front and heavy traffic resulted in jamming. The 
directing stations were forced to move as the brigades forged ahead. 
From 26 August to 6 September Canadian divisional, brigade and 
artillery stations handled 1,107 wireless messages or 138 on average 
per day. By comparison, 500 daily despatch rider letters were relayed 
at divisional level and 2,170 at corps level.113
A 1st Canadian Division brigade alerted its parent formation 
via wireless of an impending enemy counterattack, while the forward 
lines were out of service. Loop sets and Power Buzzers were not used 
because a brigade signal officer believed “better results” were ensured 
111  Notes on Lessons Learned, RG9 III-C-3, Volume 4028, Folder 17, File 20, LAC.
112  Report on Wireless Communication During the Operations at Arras, Aug. 26th-
Sept. 10th, 1918, Canadian Corps, RG9 III-C-I, Volume 3923, Folder 11, File 3, LAC; 
and  Steel, “Wireless Telegraphy,”  8, 3 (April 1931): 389-92. Steel referred to the 
Canadian Corps Survey Section incorrectly as the Canadian Field Survey Section.
113  Steel, “Wireless Telegraphy,” 8, 3 (April 1931): 397-98; Priestley, Work of R.E. 
in the European War, 316; and Brig.-Gen. Norman Webber, 8 September 1918, RG9 
III-C-5, Volume 4388, Folder 16, File 15, LAC. 
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by maintaining telephone lines.114 The 3rd Canadian Division’s Loop 
sets between the 7th Brigade and the 49th Battalion were maintained 
for emergencies only. On 2 September, a direct hit destroyed the 
11th Brigade’s set within five minutes of operation.115 Fearing the 
4th Brigade’s wireless station assembled close to their headquarters 
would draw shell fire, the brigade major ordered the station moved 
to an open trench 100 yards away. The set become very damp from 
the rain. Consequently the brigade remained out of touch by wireless 
with the division all day. The damaged set with its weak signal was 
replaced the next day.116 
On 4 September, the CIF reached the rear station over 9 miles 
away with a strong R9 signal.117 The greatest distance between two 
CW sets Mk. III in the 2nd Canadian Divisional Artillery sector was 
7 miles. The corps message station, the CCSS’s headquarters and 
its four posts and Brutinel’s CIF handled 1,890 wireless messages 
from 26 August to 10 September.118 Brig.-Gen. William King, 4th 
Canadian Divisional Artillery commander, was exceedingly pleased 
with CW wireless, stating that he “would not go into action again 
without those sets. They transmitted and received very important 
messages when other means had failed.”119
Unfortunately, transportation shook CW wireless equipment, 
necessitating complete overhauling, according to Forde’s Arras 
operations observations. Inadequate wireless understanding among 
brigade staff meant that messages to division often went by wire or 
despatch rider. In open warfare, wireless served as auxiliary to wire 
114  Appendix G Report by 1st Canadian Divisional Signal Company, in 1st Canadian 
Report on Arras Operations Drocourt-Quéant Line, RG9 III-D-2, Volume 4793, File 
44, LAC.
115  Report on Wireless Communications During the Operations At Arras, Aug. 26th-
Sept. 10th, 1918, 3rd and 4th Canadian Divisions, RG9 III-C-1, Volume 3923, Folder 
11, File 3, LAC.
116  Part 3, Report on Wireless Communications During the Operations At Arras, 
General Report On Wireless Telegraph Communications, CWM MHRC; and Captain 
Donald MacFarlane, RG9 III-C-1, Volume 3912, Folder 41, File 16, LAC.
117  R1 very faint, R3 faint, R5 fair, R7 good and R9 strong. See Handbook of 
Procedure, Wireless Telegraphy, Appendix III, RG24-C-6-k, Volume 22022, LAC.
118  Steel, “Wireless Telegraphy,” 8, 3 (April 1931): 392-97.
119  Report on Wireless Communications During the Operations At Arras, Aug. 26th-
Sept. 10th, 1918, 4th Canadian Division, RG9 III-C-1, Volume 3923, Folder 11, File 
3, LAC.
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and despatch services.120 In fact, Subramanian and Gooday argue 
the primary alternative to wire-based communication was signal 
despatch (runner, motorcycle, horseback and visual).121 According to 
another report: 
Wireless is proving to be a most valuable, vital and reliable supplementary 
method of communication … So far C.W. Wireless has been used only 
for Artillery purposes and has proved entirely satisfactory, as it works 
splendidly over long ranges and gives little trouble from jambing [sic].122 
On 27 September, Sergeant Charles Glaysher, 1st Canadian 
Divisional Signal Company, established a report centre east of the 
Canal du Nord shortly after the 5:20 a.m. assault by two Canadian 
divisions. His wireless aerials were shot down three times within 
thirty minutes.123 The communications network from the division to 
14th Battalion included BF sets between divisional and 3rd Brigade 
headquarters, a telephone line from 3rd Brigade to its report centre 
(Paviland Wood, west of the canal) and Loop sets between the 
report centre and 14th Battalion headquarters, east of the canal.124 
They resorted to Loop sets as lines had become over extended. The 
4th Canadian Division successfully employed Loop sets between 
divisional headquarters and the divisional OP.125 A wireless report 
claimed: “W/T communication was invaluable at intervals.”126 Once 
again, wireless was vital when telephonic and telegraphic networks 
failed or were congested.127
120  Report on Wireless Communications During the Operations At Arras, Aug. 26th-
Sept. 10th, 1918, 4th Canadian Division, LAC.
121  Subramanian and Gooday, “British Telecommunications History in the First 
World War,” 220.
122  WD, 4th Canadian Divisional Signal Company, Communications, From the 1st 
to 5th September 1918, LAC.
123  John Livesay, Canada’s Hundred Days: With the Canadian Corps from Amiens 
to Mons (Toronto: Thomas Allen, 1919), 218.
124  WD, Report on Communications Operations – Sept. 27th 1918, 3rd Canadian 
Infantry Brigade, September 1918, RG9 III-D-3, Volume 4878, File 229, LAC.
125  WD, 4th Canadian Divisional Signal Company, October 1918, Report on 
Communications 4th Canadian Division 26-9-18 to 2-10-18, October 1918, LAC.
126  Canal du Nord, Appendix G Report by 1st Canadian Signal Company, RG9 
III-D-2, Volume 4797, File 45, LAC.
127  Report by 1st Canadian Divisional Signal Company, C.E., Bourlon Wood 
Operations, RG9 III-C-5, Volume 4438, Folder 1, File 1, LAC.
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After breaching the Hindenburg Line, the “main difficulty 
confronting Signals was that of keeping up with the advancing troops 
… [Signals] had to be adapted to the needs of a mobile force.”128 
Telephone wires were practically non-existent during the advance 
averaging 2.7 miles per day. As the Canadian Corps drive came to a 
halt on 24 October at the Canal de l’Escaut, wired communication 
was essentially absent. Artillery brigades and the CCSS relied on 
CW wireless. A rear directing station controlled spark traffic with a 
powerful Telefunken transmitter. Late in October, the 1st Canadian 
Divisional Signal Company issued a report: 
As distances became too great, the use of wireless was somewhat lost, 
also there is the length of time necessary to code and decode. A remedy 
would be Sets of at least 10 miles range and if possible continuous wave 
instead of Spark, due to the closer tuning that is possible and hence 
eliminate of [sic] jamming, etc.129 
The 4th Canadian Division launched its assault on Mont Houy 
and Valenciennes at 5:15 a.m. on 1 November. Seven CW groups 
were operating in the corps area, each on a different wavelength. 
A divisional OP was established on Mont Houy equipped with a 
telephone and a Loop set. Wireless messages were transmitted to 
10th Canadian Brigade headquarters where they were relayed by a 
BF set to 4th Division headquarters at Denain. Hardly any wireless 
traffic was handled, although spark wireless between the division 
and its three brigades worked up to 15,000 yards; telephonic and 
telegraphic traffic prevailed.130 Over 25,000 yards of line were in use 
in one infantry brigade’s sector alone. A field artillery officer claimed 
“the telephone communications were never better.”131 However, 
McNaughton reported that some of the fire control system’s main 
telephone lines were destroyed by shell fire.132
128  Moir, History of the Royal Canadian Corps of Signals, 35.
129  Lessons Learned – Douai-Valenciennes Advance, RG9 III-C-5, Volume 4438, 
Folder 1, File 1, LAC.
130  WD, 4th Canadian Divisional Signal Company, Communications 4th Canadian 
Division 25-10-18 to 7-11-18, November 1918, LAC.
131  Operations For Capture Of Valenciennes, 4th Canadian Divisional Artillery, RG9 
III-C-1, Volume 3914, Folder 46, File 16, LAC.
132  A. McNaughton, “The Capture of Valenciennes: A Study in Co-ordination,” 
Canadian Defence Quarterly 10, 3 (April 1933): 292. 
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In the last week of the war, as the Canadians pursued the enemy 
rapidly across the border into Belgium, W/T was indispensable, 
especially between divisions and brigades. After the Armistice, 
during the march to the Rhine, CW wireless operated from army 
headquarters down to Canadian divisions and 1st Canadian 
Divisional brigades.133 CW wireless was recommended for brigades 
back to GHQ to alleviate jamming and spark wireless for use in the 
most forward area.134
conclusion
Commanders and staff officers were apprehensive of insecure 
wireless operations and sceptical of its capabilities. Accustomed 
to years of waging battle with wired communications, they could 
not relinquish their dependency on telephone and telegraph. Some 
unit commanders believed that good communication meant spoken 
communication. In the first two years of war, the lack of proper 
wireless organisation in Canadian formations and units meant 
knowledge of wireless capabilities from complicated, delicate sets 
were not inculcated, resulting in its underemployment. In 1916 
Maj.-Gen. Richard Turner believed wireless was ineffective beyond 
brigade headquarters where shellfire destroyed aerials and masts. 
Senior signal officers stubbornly clung to the telephone habit, lacking 
confidence in wireless until mid-1917.135 Before wireless was proven 
effective at Passchendaele, Lieut.-Gen. Arthur Currie considered 
it “subsidiary” to other communications media.136 McNaughton’s 
pigeon experiment and his preference for telephone flash spotting 
underlined senior officers’ reservations. Nonetheless, the Canadian 
Corps did adapt to W/T developments throughout the First World 
War. Captain Basil Schonland considered Canadian Corps’ wireless 
133  Moir, History of the Royal Canadian Corps of Signals, 40.
134  Appendix G, General Report On Wireless Telegraph Communications, CWM 
MHRC.
135  D. Campbell, “The Divisional Experience in the C.E.F.,” 256; and Nalder, The 
Royal Corps of Signals, 218. Some telephone adherents became disenchanted upon 
learning of the security risk of overheard conversations.
136  Bill Rawling, Surviving Trench Warfare: Technology and the Canadian Corps, 
1914-1918 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992), 135.
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a model of efficiency.137 Priestley noted that the “Canadian and 
Australian Corps, [were] often more hospitable to fresh departures in 
signalling than the Imperial troops.”138 
Early in 1918, wireless stations were not transmitting any traffic 
to each other.139 Daily use would have made W/T more efficient and 
reliable, but signal security exigencies and obsessions throttled it.140 
The telephone—though not infallible with its 6-foot deep buried 
cables, danger zone and voice discipline—continued to dominate at 
operational and tactical levels of command and control.141 During 
the Second Battles of Arras alone, the Canadian Corps expended 
1,718 miles of cable.142 In September, Brig.-Gen. Griesbach remarked: 
“it is obvious that we cannot continue to lay wires at the present 
reckless rate.”143 By mid-1918, W/T had become an essential 
signalling procedure. Nevertheless, telephone, telegraph and despatch 
services never relinquished their role as the most popular means of 
communication on the Western Front.144 Unlike naval wireless, army 
wireless technology had not achieved adulthood. In reality, CW 
wireless transitioned into adolescence while spark wireless (its “golden 
age” was 1900 to 1915) began its obsolescence by 1919 and its use on 
all frequencies was forbidden in 1940.145 
137  Schonland, “W/T. R.E.,” 7, 79 (October 1919): 396.
138  Priestley, Work of R.E. in the European War, 226.
139  Memo, 12 January 1918, RG9 III-C-3, Volume 4031, Folder 25, File 4, LAC. 
140  John Ferris, ed., The British Army and Signals Intelligence During the First 
World War (Gloucestershire: Alan Sutton for the Army Records Society, 1992), 6.
141  Some 3,300 miles of field cable were dispensed weekly in 1918. See Boraston 
Sir Douglas Haig’s Despatches, 335. The German field telephone network in 1917 
stretched over 920,000 km (571,000 miles) on both fronts. See Jörn Leonhard, 
Pandora’s Box: A History of the First World War (Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
Belknap Press, 2018), 518.
142  Maj. Earnshaw, Use of Field Cables, 6 September, 1918, RG9 III-C-3, Volume 
4057, Folder 35, File 6, LAC. 
143  Travers, How the War was Won, 151. However, some insisted that during mobile 
operations, telephone usage was more dependable due to “the scattered nature of 
the shell fire.” See Major James Hahn, The Intelligence Service within the Canadian 
Corps 1914-1918 (Toronto: MacMillan Company, 1930), 15.
144  Cable was viewed as “the most valuable form of communication.” See SS 135 The 
Training and Employment of Divisions, 1918, January 1918, 44, REF TECH U 510 
G7 T7 1918, CWM MHRC. 
145  Aitken, The Continuous Wave, 59; and Admiralty Handbook of Wireless Telegraphy 
Vol II: Wireless Telegraphy Theory (London: HM Stationery Service, 1938), Section 
K, 1 and Section A, 1-2.
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Canadian technical innovations were assimilated into the evolving 
signalling infrastructure. An interception-prevention method for the 
supposedly secure Fullerphone was developed in February 1918.146 In 
August 1918 the CIF communicated over a CW set behind German 
lines. The Canadians were first to perform flash spotting with CW 
wireless as the only means of communication. In late October 1918, 
Steel built a receiver with seven separate tuning circuits with all 
outputs mixed in the telephone receiver, permitting the CW control 
station operator to listen to all seven CW stations simultaneously 
instead of listening briefly to one at a time. However, it was not only 
a matter of chasing the technology, but also organising, training and 
deploying wireless operators expert in Morse code and proficient in 
ciphering and interception techniques. Technical and organisational 
innovations produced a more efficient wireless network.
By war’s end, battlefield communications were an amalgamation 
of traditional methods and technological advances. The 15th British 
Division, for instance, maintained flexible tactical communications in 
shell-swept areas with wireless, pigeons, runners and motorcyclists.147 
A combination of cable, wireless and motorcyclist despatch riders 
would produce a first-rate communications system in the Second 
World War.148 
Once adapted to trench warfare, W/T provided temporary 
communication in emergency situations when the Signal Service’s 
backbone of cable and airline routes had failed. In the Hundred Days 
campaign, after the advance had outrun forward line communication, 
of necessity wireless became a viable alternative, its relevance 
accelerated by open warfare.149 The knowledge that an alternative 
was readily available was invaluable. Nevertheless, signal despatch 
remained the primary alternative to wire, especially when wireless 
traffic was enciphered. The Canadian Corps depended on W/T as 
146  The lightweight (18.5 lb) DC-driven Fullerphone was practically immune to 
interception by induction or earth leakage, thanks to very weak (microamps) Morse 
signals superimposed on the telephone lines.
147  Lt.-Col. H. Crichton, Operations of 15th Division, 8 October, 1918, RG9 III-C-3, 
Volume 4028, Folder 17, File 20, LAC.
148  Brian Hall, “Technological Adaptation in a Global Conflict: the British Army and 
Communications beyond the Western Front, 1914-1918,” Journal of Military History 
78, 1 (2014): fn 186.
149  Nalder declared wireless in 1918 continued to be a practical stand-by method of 
communications and early in the Second World War. See Nalder, The Royal Corps 
of Signals, 150, 289.
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an auxiliary system for surplus traffic during line congestion in 
battle conditions. Specifically, W/T was crucial while acting as the 
sole means of communication, as in the CIF’s thrust into enemy 
territory and CCSS flash spotting. However, neither infantry nor 
artillery maintained an exclusive reliance on W/T as a tactical 
communication system in the forward area. Although W/T with its 
nascent capabilities was not a decisive war-winning technology that 
substantially enhanced battlefield communication on the Western 
Front, W/T operators “contributed in no small measure to the final 
victory.”150
Had it been possible to issue CW sets along with suitable 
transportation to all arms of the service, transmitting in clear CW 
wireless with its minimal interference and longer ranges would have 
150  Schonland, “W/T. R.E.,” 7, 76 (July 1919): 174.
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rivalled wired communication in open warfare. Instantaneous two-
way voice communication at the forward edge of battle would make its 
military debut in the next technological world war, when the portable 
bi-directional radio transceiver (walkie-talkie) was introduced.
appendix a: substitution cipher using keyword
A keyword was used to assign the value of letters for a series of 
messages on a given cipher system. The W/T cipher keywords for 
the British Army’s Field Cipher used by the Canadian Corps were 
updated every midnight. For example, the keyword for the 2nd 
Canadian Division on 11 March 1918 was Asparagus and the next 
day Congratulate.151 For a simple substitution (plain) cipher using 
the keyword Congratulate, letter A is replaced by C, B by O, C by 
N, J by E, K by B, etc. 
Plaintext alphabet:       ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ
Ciphertext alphabet:     CONGRATULEBDFHIJKMPQSVWXYZ
In 1918 experts using the British Field Cipher spent thirteen 
minutes enciphering, transmitting and deciphering a fourteen-word 
message.152 By comparison, a forty-word telegram message sent in 
clear required 2.5 minutes to send.
◆     ◆     ◆     ◆
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